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Agricultural Trade Reform and Rural Prosperity:  
Lessons from China  
 
China’s agriculture has grown rapidly in recent years, despite radical reductions in 
agricultural tariffs (Huang and Chen, 1999; and Huang et al., 2004). China’s agriculture 
has moved from a focus on self sufficiency and industry-first growth, through the Open 
Door Policy of the 1980s, to a much more market-oriented regime. Accession to the 
World Trade Organization was allowed only after China promised major institutional 
reforms and a virtually unprecedented degree of tariff reduction, the abolition of export 
subsidies, and introduction of constraints on domestic support (Lardy, 2001; Bhattasali, 
Li and Martin 2004). 
In response to the committment to reform trade as well as domestic markets, there 
were fears that such sharp liberalization would have dire consequences for the rural 
population. In poor countries, government officials know that agricultural price shifts can 
have important effects on domestic food production, farm household incomes, national 
poverty rates and overall rural stability. Many voices focused on the cuts in agricultural 
tariffs and warned that poverty in China would be exacerbated and rural incomes would 
fall if the nation were to follow through with their ambitious domestic market and trade 
liberalization policies (Carter and Estrin 2001; Li et al. 1999; Schmidhuber 2001, Ni 
2007). Even in light of these concerns, policy makers have pushed ahead.  
By the mid-2000s, the concerns about rural incomes of critics of trade policies had 
not been realized. Even scholars who have long worried about poor income growth in the 
rural areas are admitting the incomes and rural welfare are rising as never before. 
Although the gap in incomes between urban and rural people remains large, conventional 
measures of this gap are overstated by neglecting the lower costs of living in rural areas   2
and by the exclusion of rural migrants living in urban areas when calculating average 
urban incomes (Sicular, Ximing, Gustaffson and Li 2006; Chen and Ravallion 2007, 
NBSC 2007).  
Although there has long been an interest in the agricultural economy (e.g., Lardy, 
1983; Sicular, 1988b; Lin, 1992; Rosen et al., 2004), it is quite surprising to many that 
the agricultural sector of China actually has a very impressive record. Growth rates of 
gross domestic product, agricultural value added and food per capita increased 
dramatically between the early 1980s and the mid-2000s. Indeed, China's performance in 
agriculture over the past two decades was more impressive than any other country in 
Asia. Markets have boomed. The structure of agriculture has fundamentally shifted. 
Despite having the largest population in the world and high income growth (which has 
radically changed consumption patterns), China has remained a net exporter of 
agricultural products until very recently, with a recent switch to net import status due 
largely to increased cotton imports needed for burgeoning exports of textiles and 
clothing. A new report by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC, 2006) 
demonstrates that rural incomes grew robustly between 2002 and 2005 and did so in all 
income deciles and all provinces (see Table 1).  
The overall goal of this paper is to address these questions using two specific 
approaches. The first is to present estimates of indicators of direct and indirect 
interventions of China’s government in agriculture from 1981, when it first became 
possible to assess the stance of trade policies, to 2005, when almost all of China’s WTO 
commitments had been phased in. To achieve this objective, we examine the differences 
in prices between international prices and domestic prices at the border (Nominal Rates   3
of Assistance or NRA at the market level and NRAf at the farm level).  Because input-
related policies were relatively small over most of our sample period, we focus on the 
transfers associated with changes in commodity prices, although we include the effects of 
input measures in our estimates of support to farmers. In the most general terms, we find 
that China shifted from an economy that was highly distorted with a generally taxed 
agricultural sector, to one that was highly integrated with the world economy.  
In the second part of the paper, we seek to understand what allowed the rural 
economy to do as well as it has in the face of falling prices for some products. To do so, 
we examine four factors: investments in agricultural technology; the policy responses 
aimed at deregulating agricultural markets and promoting structural adjustment; the new 
set of programs that has redirect resources towards rural infrastructure and services as 
well as relatively non-distorting transfer programs and tax cuts; and policies aimed at 
facilitating the movement of labor from agriculture to industry and from rural to urban. 
The wide scope of our goals and objectives necessitate certain limitations. First, 
the absence of data precludes our examining the entire agricultural sector. Instead, we 
examine commodities that account for two-thirds or more of gross output value over our 
study period. Second, although we are able to judge from the price trends and our 
understanding of domestic marketing and trade policy reforms the broad sources of the 
shifts in the distortions of the agricultural economy, we can not identify the exact source 
of changes and must rely on earlier work by the authors and others examining these 
causal linkages in more detail (Huang and Rozelle, 1996; deBrauw et al., 2004). Thirdly, 
because of the complexity of agricultural trade instruments during the period—including 
state trading, quotas, licenses, tariffs and exchange rate distortions—we were forced to   4
use price comparison approaches even though exchange rates were distorted by a two-tier 
exchange rate system up to 1994. During this period, we used an exchange rate adjusted 
for the two-tier exchange rate system to compare international prices with prices in 
China’s domestic economy, an approach used in (Martin et al., 2006).  
Before showing these results in the following section, we discuss our quantitative 
approach and sources of data. The results of the distortion analysis are presented and 
discussed in the next section. The following section discusses three policy responses that 
are likely part of the reason for the robust performance of China’s rural sector. The final 
section concludes.  
 
Methodology and data sources 
In this paper, we have utilized the approach specified in Anderson, Martin, Sandri 
and Valenzuela (henceforth, Anderson et al., 2008). The approach is primarily based on 
comparisons between domestic and international prices. During the reform era these price 
comparisons provide indicators of the incentives for production, consumption and trade, 
and of the income transfers associated with interventions.  
Our approach essentially creates two main measures of distortions for each 
commodity. The basic measure in our analysis is the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA), 
used to compare the prices of commodities in the domestic economy (at the port) with the 
international prices of commodities at the border (that is, cif in the port for importables; 
fob in the port for exportables).  
  Because of barriers within the domestic economy, the extent of protection (or dis-
protection) provided by trade policies may not be the same as the protection to farmers.   5
Since we have independent observations on the prices obtained by farmers in local 
markets we are able to estimate the nominal rate of assistance at the farm level taking 
into account both border distortions and domestic distortions affecting farmer returns 
(NRAf’s). NRAf‘s are calculated after allowing for quality adjustment, taxes or subsidies, 
and transport, storage and handling costs in moving commodities from the farm to the 
wholesale level. Differences between NRAs and NRAf’s can arise from subsidy or 
transfer payments that cause the prices received by farmers to differ from what they 
would receive under competitive internal market conditions.
1  
 
The data  
In compiling our data we necessarily had to make choices on commodity 
coverage. We included 11 commodities: rice, wheat, maize, soybeans, cotton, pork, milk, 
poultry, fruit (using apples as a representative product), vegetables (using tomatoes as a 
representative product) and sugar (both sugarbeet and sugarcane). Over the study period, 
these commodities accounted for roughly 75 percent (in the late 1980s) and 60 percent 
(during the early 2000s) of the value of agricultural output in China. Because production 
and consumption decisions were only gradually being allowed to respond to domestic 
prices, and because we do not have access to reliable data on secondary market exchange 
rates prior to 1981, we focus on the period from 1981. 
Much of the data on margins, transportation costs and other transaction costs are 
from an extensive set of surveys by Huang and Rozelle during the 1990s and the early 
2000s, surveys which also served to establish which commodity price series provided 
appropriate bases for price comparisons. Some of this was previously reported in Rozelle   6
et al. (2000) and Huang et al. (2004), which provided information on substantial quality 
differences between some imported and domestic commodities and resulting 
methodologies for ensuring valid price comparisons. For more recent years, survey teams 
from the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy interviewed traders in 10 cities around 
China in 2006. The complete data series are in the appendices of Huang et al. (2007). 
When calculating the rate of support to farmers, we took into account direct 
support measures using data from the Price Department of the National Development and 
Reform Commission. These measures included three applying since 2002—direct grain 
supports, the seed subsidy program, and agricultural machinery subsidies. We also took 
into account the negative assistance imposed by agricultural taxes on production of 
specific commodities. We did not take into account the input subsidy program that pays 
subsidies to state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) producing fertilizers, fertilizers and 
mulching film on the grounds that all or part of this may be a subsidy to the SOEs, rather 
than to the farmers. Nor did we include the “grain for green” payments made to convert 




The role of domestic price and marketing policy 
Before examining the role of distortions at the border, it is useful (and necessary) to 
examine the relationship between the available domestic price series for farm and retail 
prices for two major grain crops (Figure 1, Panels A and B). The importance (and role) of 
China’s domestic price and marketing policy for rice and wheat (the two largest crops in   7
China—one an exportable and the other an importable) can be seen by comparing the 
state-set urban retail price and the state-set farm-gate procurement price with the rural 
retail price, a free market price. Until 1992 the urban retail price for rice was generally 
well below the free-market price in rural areas, despite the costs associated with 
transferring rice to urban areas. Only urban residents could buy rice at these low prices 
and only with ration coupons that were available in limited quantities. 
The relatively low selling price of grain at the farm gate by farmers shows that 
China’s food system in the 1980s was set up to transfer income from rural to urban 
people (Figure 1, Panels A and B). The amount that farmers received for their mandatory 
deliveries was far below the free market price although, in the case of rice, it was above 
the urban retail price, suggesting urban prices were held down by a subsidy as well as by 
taxation of farmers. However, there is some question about the effects of the depressed 
rural prices on farmers’ incentives given the infra-marginal nature of many of these 
transfers (Sicular 1988a). This is because from the mid-1980s farmers were able to sell 
additional amounts at higher market prices once they had met their obligation to deliver a 
quota at the low purchasing price. As shown by Sicular (1988a), the higher out-of-quota 
price is the relevant incentive for production at the margin. However, as shown by Wang 
et al. (1999), even such policies may not be fully decoupled from incentives, with 
seemingly infra-marginal transfers giving rural household members an incentive to move 
out of agriculture.  
After 1992, however, changes to China’s domestic marketing and procurement 
system appear to have eliminated this additional layer of taxation and regulation for 
producers of rice, and wheat (Figure 1, Panels A and B). In the early 1990s the urban   8
price began to rise above the farm gate price; urban and rural retail prices also came 
much closer together. The gap between urban and rural retail prices essentially 
disappeared. And the gap between the rural retail price and the farm price declined, 
possibly suggesting an improvement in marketing efficiency (Park et al. 2002).  
 
Nominal rates of assistance for China’s main agricultural commodities 
In this section we focus on the distortions faced by farmers in China between 
1981 and 2005. To do so, we examine plots of NRAs and NRAf’s over time for an 
illustrative subsample of our 11 commodities. A more comprehensive analysis is 
contained in Huang et al. (2007).  
Distortions to the grain economy before 1995.  The distortions to the rice 
economy of China in the 1980s and early 1990s are characterized by two important 
features (Figure 2, Panel A). First, the NRA of rice, an exportable commodity, is negative 
in every year between 1980 and 1995. Ranging between -40 and -10, the negative NRAs 
show that China was highly competitive in international rice markets during these years. 
Trade policy, and particularly the state trading monopoly, kept exporters from shipping 
large quantities of rice onto world markets and kept market prices of rice in China’s port 
cities below world prices.  
The second feature demonstrates how domestic marketing and procurement 
placed a greater tax on farmers and insulated the domestic price of rice from the world 
market price even if trade policy had been liberalized (Figure 2, Panel A). The state’s 
artificially low procurement price kept the price received by farmers systematically 
below the free market price of rice as seen by the NRAf’s. Because of this the total tax on   9
rice ranged from -70 in the early 1980s to -30 in the early 1990s. Rice producers were 
among the most heavily taxed farmers in China—given the large share of the crop’s sown 
area and large negative rates of disprotection.  
Unlike rice, the NRA measures show that trade policy offered high rates of 
protection for wheat in China between 1981 and the mid-1990s (Figure 2, Panel B). In 
most years after 1980 the free market price of wheat in China’s port cities was about 60 
percent above international prices (cif, China’s port cities). Unlike rice farmers, wheat 
producers—who have been shown to produce at a higher cost than producers in many 
other countries (Huang and Ma, 2000)—benefited from high market prices for their 
marginal output. ‘By keeping out imports and keeping domestic prices high, trade policy 
appears to have been focused on food self-sufficiency, rather than on providing 
inexpensive food to urban consumers.  
The differences between rice and wheat illustrate that trade liberalization in China 
should not have been expected to hurt everyone and emphasize the importance of looking 
at distortions on a commodity by commodity basis. Trade liberalization clearly had the 
potential to help rice producers, in particular. By contrast, the removal of the high 
protection rates for wheat observed in the 1980s and early 1990s, would have had the 
potential to hurt wheat producers. Our analysis of why trade policy reform has been 
accompanied by rural income rises seems most relevant for the case of crops, such as 
wheat, that were receiving positive protection in the 1980s and 1990s.    
Domestic marketing policies, however, were working in the opposite direction. 
The trends in NRAf’s show how the forced deliveries under wheat quotas largely 
insulated farmers from much of the benefit of protection (Figure 2, Panel B). Although   10
there was still positive protection for wheat in most years between 1980 and 1995, the 
average rates were lower (all below 50 percent except for in 1994 and 1995) and were 
zero and even slightly negative in 5 of the 16 years (1981; 1982; 1990; 1992; 1993). 
These figures suggest that policy for wheat was trying to increase production through the 
higher market prices, but to transfer income from producers to consumers through the 
infra-marginal transfers captured in the NRAf. Huang et al. (2007) show that the story for 
maize is similar to that of wheat. 
Distortions to the grain economy after 1995. After 1995 our distortions analysis 
shows that China’s international trade and domestic marketing policies have changed 
strikingly (Figures 2—right hand sides of panels). That China’s reformers were able to 
eliminate the procurement policies that had been taxing rice and wheat (and maize) 
farmers is apparent from the way the differences between NRAs and NRAf’s narrow and 
disappear. In other work, Huang et al. (2004) show that elimination of the procurement 
quota system contributed significantly to a reduction in the tax burden on farmers. In part, 
then, procurement policy reform itself was one of the ways that help increase rural 
incomes to farmers during the 1990s.  
The liberalization of domestic policies in the mid-1990s was accompanied by 
liberalization of trade policy, at least in the case of China’s major food grains. After 1995 
the taxation and subsidization of rice and wheat were being phased out as the NRAs for 
rice steadily rose (became less negative) and the NRAs for wheat fell. Likely in part in 
preparation for its accession to the WTO, China’s leaders liberalized trade for its main 
food grains to such an extent that between 1995 and 2001 most of the protection for these   11
crops was eliminated. Since 2001, the NRAs for both rice and wheat have been almost 
zero.  
Edible oils, milk and sugar. Outside the grain economy, marketing and trade 
reform, as in the case of wheat, removed positive protection from a number of key 
commodities. The biggest difference between the analysis of distortions for grain crops 
and cash crops (in our case, for soybeans) is that domestic marketing policy has 
historically played less of a role for cash crops. Although some counties had procurement 
delivery quotas for soybean producers, this was not as widespread as for grain and the 
implicit taxes on soybeans in counties with quotas were generally lower than for staple 
grains. There was, as a consequence, little difference between the graphs for NRAs and 
NRAf’s. The same applies for the remaining commodities (livestock; horticulture and 
milk and sugar), because there was no state-mandated procurement for these 
commodities, As a result, the discussion in the rest of this section focuses on trade policy. 
Before 1995, our analysis shows that soybeans fluctuated between being taxed 
and protected (Figure 3). Although the average level of protection was roughly zero, it 
varied from -20 percent up to 30 percent. A paper by Rozelle and Huang (2004) shows 
that much of this fluctuation was due to domestic policy cycles that switched between 
encouraging and discouraging production, while allowing little trade.  
The trends in NRAs after 1995 show the strong commitment to trade 
liberalization for soybeans (Figure 3, right hand side of the graph). Beginning in the late 
1990s and continuing through 2005 protection for soybeans fell from around 30 percent 
to almost zero. This falling protection, in fact, should not be a surprise given the 
integration of China into world soybean markets and the monotonic rise in imports   12
(which exceeded 25 million tons in 2005). The story of soybeans after 1995 parallels that 
of wheat. In fact, because of the high level of imports, the case of soybean producers 
often raised in discussions about the adverse effects of trade policies on farmers (see 
Rozelle and Huang, 2004 for a complete description). In fact, Rozelle and Huang (2004) 
empirically show using CAPSiM (an agricultural simulation model developed by the 
authors) that soybean prices and the incomes of soybean producers would have been 
higher in the absence of trade reform. Therefore, in the case of soybeans the government 
carried through with its commitment to trade reform.  
Protection of milk and sugar began earlier and remained higher than for soybeans. 
During the 1980s the NRAs for milk and sugar were large and positive (Figure 4, Panels 
A and B), with milk ranging between 50 and over 200 percent between 1980 and 1987, 
and sugar above 40 percent through the late 1990s. NRAs for milk fell dramatically in the 
late 1980s, and subsequently fluctuated between zero and 50 percent. Protection for sugar 
also fell in the late 1980s, but subsequently rose, with the average NRA fluctuating 
around 40 percent.  
Livestock and horticultural commodities. The case of livestock (Figure 5 for pork) 
and horticulture (not shown here—see Huang et al., 2007) show that trade liberalization 
directly helped raise farm incomes in certain regions and sectors. During the early reform 
era there was heavy implicit taxation of livestock and horticultural commodities. 
Although China can competitively produce labor-intensive livestock and horticultural 
products, producers were not encouraged to produce or export these commodities on a 
large scale. Part of the resistance to exports was from China’s own barriers, such as 
quotas on exports to Hong Kong. Another part of the price gap shown in these figures   13
reflects trade barriers facing China in export markets. While there quite possibly were 
grounds for some of these barriers (for example, foot and mouth disease is widespread in 
China), even blatantly false claims could not be contested since China was not a WTO 
member. As a consequence, China’s livestock and horticultural producers produced 
commodities far below the world market price yet were unable to increase exports into 
global markets.  
Aggregate impacts. We separated the commodities in our study into importable 
and exportable groups, and used production weights at undistorted prices to aggregate 
them. Assuming that our study commodities largely reflect the distortions to all 
commodities, there is a striking pattern (Figure 6—left hand side of figure) that reinforces 
the positive relationship between trade liberalization and rural incomes. In the 1980s and 
through the mid-1990s, importables (such as wheat, soybeans, milk and sugar) were 
protected. On average, their protection rates were between 15 and 35 percent. The same 
was true for exportables, except the distortions show that commodities such as rice, 
livestock commodities and horticultural commodities were taxed at rates ranged from 40 
to 50 percent. With exportable agricultural products accounting for a larger share of 
output than importables, China’s average agricultural distortions were negative. In other 
words, China was taxing its agriculture—with both its international trade and domestic 
marketing policies.  
  One of the main findings of this study is evident from the right hand side of 
Figure 6. After 1995, the NRAs of importables fell from around 20 percent to less than 10 
percent. During this period, the NRAs of exportables rose, or the implicit taxes on them 
fell, from about 40 percent to around 15 percent. When taken together, the distortions in   14
China’s agriculture fell to less than 10 percent. In many years overall protection was 
between 0 and -5 percent. The combination of domestic marketing reforms and 
international trade liberalization has created an economy that is one of the least distorted 
in the world. It also helped China enjoy rising incomes (in the aggregate) at the same 
time that it was reforming trade policies. One key to this was the removal of agricultural 
taxation. Another was allowing farmers to produce the goods that would generate the 
greatest benefit at international prices. 
When considering the impact of trade reform on the agricultural sector, it is not 
sufficient to consider only the instruments directly affecting the sector. The pathbreaking 
study of distortions to agricultural incentives in developing countries (Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdés 1991) showed that the indirect taxation of agriculture resulting from 
protection to other sectors was generally more important than direct agricultural 
distortions.  
In the case of China, this question requires particular attention since there have 
been enormous reductions in non-agricultural barriers, including tariffs, exchange rate 
overvaluation, quotas and licensing. We have combined estimates of these distortions 
into a composite measure of non-agricultural distortions depicted as an NRA for non-
agricultural tradeables in Figure 7. In a simplified two-sector model what matters is the 
relative rate of assistance (RRA) also shown in this figure. This figure shows that the 
agricultural sector benefited from a rapid reduction in both direct and indirect taxation 
between the early 1980s and 1995. In the period since 1995, the RRA has become 
positive and continued to rise, albeit at a much slower rate than in the 1981-1995 period. 
The reduction in taxation of the agricultural sector evident in this diagram is consistent   15
with the improvement in the terms of trade for agriculture relative to non-agriculture 
within China observed by Zhu and Hong (2007) using data on relative prices for 
agricultural and non-agricultural goods.  
Distinguishing the impacts of WTO accession. One final issue that needs to be 
recognized when considering the impacts of reforms associated with WTO accession is 
the nature of commitments in the WTO. China’s main WTO accession commitments on 
agriculture were commitments that tariffs would not rise above the bound levels agreed in 
China’s WTO accession schedule. These commitments were negotiated through an 
intensive process that took into account the market access interests of existing members, 
and the previously prevailing applied tariff rates. Given the nature of China’s trade 
regime, however, the relationship between these tariff rates and China’s actual protection 
was weak. For many products, the relationship between domestic and world prices was 
determined more by state trading, quotas and licenses than by tariffs.  
Table 4 shows the relationship estimated by Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) 
between applied protection prior to accession, the applied tariff, and the bound tariff 
associated with WTO accession. From the Table, it is clear that the applied tariffs for 
many commodities were strikingly above the protection actually provided. For rice, the 
applied tariff of 114 percent was quite irrelevant, with the actual protection applied being 
negative. Similarly, the applied rates of protection on wheat and maize were far below the 
applied rates of 114 percent. For only a few commodities, such as soybeans, did the 
bound rate agreed at the WTO require reductions in the protection previously applied. 
This distinction between reductions in applied rates and reductions in actual agricultural 
protection is extremely important. Much of the concern about potential adverse impacts   16
of WTO commitments expressed either in prospect by authors such as Schmidhuber 
(2001) or Carter and Estrin (2001) or retrospectively by authors such as Ni (2007) is 
based on the reductions in tariff rates required by WTO accession. 
 
Policies to Support Market and Trade Liberalization 
Our analysis that documents reductions in the distortions to China’s agriculture helps us 
meet our first objective. China’s policy makers have successfully carried out their 
promises to liberalize markets and trade. In some sense the analysis also helps explain the 
second puzzle. Because of the rising share of livestock and horticulture in China’s 
agricultural economy, and because trade liberalization actually eliminated negative 
protection in these sectors, the average level of protection (combining the net effects of 
commodities that were having their positive protection removed and the commodities that 
were being less taxed) moved towards zero. In this way, trade policy was helping to 
increase farm incomes. In the period since 1995, liberalization elsewhere in the economy 
reduced the taxation of the agricultural sector leading to the rise in the relative rate of 
assistance noted in Figure 7. In this way trade policy changes can contribute, in part, to 
the explanation of how rural China avoided declining during trade liberalizations.  
However, the story needs more explanation. In part, the additional explanation is 
needed because rural incomes not only rose on average, but rose in all provinces (Table 
1). The rise in income occurred in all provinces, including those in northern, northeastern 
and northwestern China. In these regions of China, farmers produce many crops (wheat, 
maize, soybeans and cotton) that were still receiving positive protection during the late 
1990s and early 2000s. With this set of crops accounting for a large share of the crop area   17
in northern, northeast and northwestern China, there remains a puzzle to explain. Why 
did incomes rise in those areas even though we know that incomes of some producers 
would have suffered from trade liberalization-induced cuts in protection. Part of the 
explanation is presumably the reduction in the cost structure resulting from rapid 
liberalization in the rest of the economy. In the rest of this section we discuss several key 
policy reforms that we believe contributed to rural incomes rising even while agricultural 
protection fell.  
 
Development and Dissemination of Agricultural Technology 
The importance of agricultural research and extension in increasing agricultural 
productivity in developing countries is now widely recognized. Successful development 
has been shown to be tied closely to productivity growth in the agricultural sector (World 
Bank 2008). In a country like China, where agriculture is dominated by small, poor 
farms, it is even more important.  
During the reform era, it was not always clear whether China would be able to 
maintain the pace of technological advance needed to maintain farm incomes in a 
dynamic economy. While decollectivization played the key role in boosting productivity 
(Lin, 1992) in the early stages of reform, this provided only a one-off boost to 
productivity. After 1985, the evidence suggests that technological advance has been the 
main engine of productivity growth (Huang and Rozelle, 1996). China was one of the 
first countries to develop and extend Green Revolution technology in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s. Hybrid rice was developed by China’s scientists in the late 1970s and, until   18
the mid-1990s, it was the only country in the world to have commercialized this new 
technology. 
Despite these and other successes, China’s system of agricultural research faced 
great challenges by the late 1980s (Pray et al., 1997). Research investment, almost totally 
publicly funded, was declining. Incentives were poor and funding was being allocated in 
ways that did not always reward excellence. The system was not responding to many 
demands for new technologies and, the extension system was in shambles.  
A nationwide reform in research was launched in the mid-1980s (Pray et al., 
1997). The reforms attempted to increase research productivity by shifting funding from 
institutional support to competitive grants, supporting research useful for economic 
development, and encouraging applied research institutes to support themselves by 
selling the technology they produced. In addition, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new 
horticultural seeds, improved breeding livestock (Rae et al., 2006) and new technologies 
for dairy were all imported (Ma et al., 2006). 
After declining between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s (Pray et al., 1997), 
investment in R&D also began to rise. Funding was greatly increased for plant 
biotechnology, although only only Bt cotton has been commercialized in a major way to 
date (Huang et al., 2002). China now ranks among the global leaders in agricultural 
biotechnology.  In the late 1990s China invested more in agricultural biotechnology 
research than all other developing countries combined. Its public spending on agricultural 
biotechnology was second only to the US and, according to some projections, it will soon 
outspend the US government on plant biotechnology research. Investment in 
government-sponsored R&D increased by 5.5 percent annually between 1995 and 2000   19
and by over 15 percent per year after 2000 (Hu et al., 2007). During the past decade, the 
increase in investment in rural research and development has been the most rapid of any 
large nation. 
The investment in R&D has been paying off. During China’s early reform period 
the yields of major food crops rose steadily (Table 2, column 1). Although some of that 
yield increase came from greater efficiency in input use, technological improvements 
appear to have accounted for some of this growth, since indices of aggregated inputs (that 
is, measures of land, labor and material inputs) for rice, wheat, and maize actually fell for 
all the crops during the early 1980s (column 2).  
Although there was concern about the effect of the slowdown in R&D spending 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, the analysis shows that the growth of output continued 
to outpace that for inputs (Table 2, columns 3 and 4). And, productivity trends continued 
to rise (Table 3, column 2). During this time—and during the early reform period—
China’s TFP has been rising at the healthy rate of about 2 percent per year. Such rises, 
which occurred in all provinces and with all crops, could not have helped but increase 
incomes—of all farmers—regardless of whether the crop was being protected or taxed. 
 
Policies to Encourage Market Integration and Efficiency 
Price and marketing reforms have been key components of China’s transition strategy 
from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented economy. These policies were 
implemented in a gradual way (Sicular, 1995). In the initial years there was little effort to 
move the economy to one in which most all resources and factors were allocated 
according market price signals. Over time the government’s position on market reform   20
has gradually evolved. As officials in charge of the overall economic reforms began to be 
committed to use markets as the primary means to allocate resources for the economy, 
the commitment to allowing markets in agriculture also deepened (Sicular, 1995). 
As markets began to emerge, China’s leaders took steps to encourage the 
efficiency of markets and, perhaps more importantly, stepped aside and allowed them to 
expand in an environment with minimal distortions. Above all national and regional 
governments invested in the hardware—roads, landline telephones and cellular 
technology—that reduced transaction costs and accelerated the flow of information and 
goods (Park et al., 2002). Many regional and local governments invested in marketing 
sites and tried to attract commercial interests to set up businesses. Finally, except for a 
short period in the late 1990s, government officials have stepped back and allowed the 
entry of private traders and private transport and done little to interfere with markets. 
Licensing fees and taxes are low or non-existent. Markets were encouraged for both 
agricultural outputs and inputs. 
In assessing the health of the rural economy, it is important to understand how 
China’s markets are functioning. Markets—whether classic competitive ones or some 
workable substitute—increase efficiency by facilitating transactions among agents to 
allow specialization and trade and by providing information through a pricing mechanism 
to producers and consumers about the relative scarcity of resources. With better markets, 
producers can begin to specialize, become more efficient and increase their incomes.   
According to price data from private reporting stations and information firms, it 
appears that China’s markets function relatively well. For example, maize prices in for 
different cities in Northeast China track each other closely (Rozelle and Huang, 2003).   21
Soybean prices in markets in different regions of the country move almost in perfect 
concert with one another (Rozelle and Huang, 2004). Rice markets also have been shown 
to function as well as or better than those in the United States in terms of the efficiency of 
moving commodities around and between China’s producing and consuming regions 
(Huang et al., 2004). Horticultural, dairy and livestock markets are all dominated by 
millions of small traders who are operating in extremely competitive environments 
(Wang et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2007; Bi et al., 2007).  
The improvement in markets has allowed individual producers to specialize as 
never before. According to one national survey, the number of villages that have become 
specialized producers of a single commodity rose from less than 20 percent in 1995 to 
nearly 40 percent in 2004 (Rosen et al., 2004). Such integration has allowed relatively 
small and poor farmers to participate in emerging markets and to accrue the substantial 
income gains associated with moving from subsistence to a market orientatin (Wang et al., 
2007; Bi et al., 2007; Balat and Porto 2006). In fact, in a recent survey of the greater 
metropolitan Beijing area, it was found that poor farmers living in poor villages were the 
main beneficiaries of new demands for horticultural commodities.  
Most importantly, according to deBrauw et al. (2004), when markets in China 
have begun to become more competitive and efficient, they have led to rising 
productivity and efficiency. The link between improved markets and rising incomes is 
important because it is consistent with our puzzle. Even where market and trade 
liberalization has reduced protection and necessarily adversely affected income, the rising 
productivity and efficiency effects have at least partly offset these negative impacts. This 
interpretation is supported by the modeling work in Huang et al. (2005) which finds when   22
trade policy positively affects some prices (e.g., horticultural crops), but negatively 
affects others (e.g., wheat), farmers mitigate the downside effects by transferring 
production into the commodities with rising prices.  
 
Public Investment, Services and Subsidies 
  Any visitor to most parts of rural China is struck by one thing: Agriculture is still 
being carried out in many environments that can only be described as backward. Except 
in a few suburban and coastal regions, the infrastructure in rural China is extremely poor.  
Roads and bridges, irrigation and drainage, drinking water, schools and health facilities 
are far from modern and decades behind the infrastructure in China’s cities. Yet 
development economists know that for a country to modernize, its infrastructure has to be 
able to support the production and marketing activities of a complex economy. 
  Although the stock of infrastructure is poor there have been improvements in 
recent years. Research has shown that on average each village in China had about one 
infrastructure project during the late 1990s (Luo et al. 2007). This is far higher than in 
most other developing nations in Asia. In recent years, the level of investment activity 
has risen sharply (to almost one project per year). Most of these projects are public goods 
(and not activities, such as orchards, in which governments frequently invested during the 
1980s). In addition, research suggests that this investment is being targeted fairly well, 
with increasing amounts going to poor, minority and remote parts of China.  
  Although the level of public goods investment per capita has risen from about 40 
to 100 US dollars (in PPP terms), it is still far below the levels that were enjoyed by rural 
residents in Japan during the 1950s and South Korea during the 1970s (Luo et al., 2007).   23
Quality, while rising, is still low in many villages (Liu et al., 2007). China is just 
beginning the process of narrowing the gap between rural and urban infrastructure and it 
will take an enormous and sustained effort to transform the rural economy.  
 
Education and Health Programs 
Rural services—in particular education and health—are perhaps the weakest part of the 
rural economy, despite the recognition by development economists of their importance. 
Rural education by any metric is abysmal. Fees—until recently—were high, even for 
elementary school. Buildings and equipment are outdated and poor. Teaching quality is 
poor. Because of poor education, there is evidence that even as the nation accelerates its 
drive towards industrialization and urbanization—and agriculture is becoming more 
complex and demanding—retention rates for farm children remain very low beyond the 
compulsory nine years of schooling. Partly because tuition and associated fees are so 
high—an estimated one-quarter of total expenditure for many poor households— 
participation rates in high school (grades 10-12) are less than 15 percent for the rural 
population. A national survey found that nearly half of rural residents believe education 
has not improved in recent years (Liu et al., 2007). 
There has been a new surge of interest by the government in improving rural 
education and reducing the cost of education—especially in poor, rural areas. In 2005, 
fees for elementary schools were eliminated in poor areas. In 2006, this was expanded to 
the entire rural economy. By 2007 all compulsory education (grades 1-9) was supposed to 
be free. The income effects of such policies are potentially enormous. Huang et al. (2004)   24
show that the elimination of government tuition fees provided a benefit more than twice 
as large as the losses resulting from tariff reductions for China’s protected crops. 
  The national and regional governments have also begun to build a rural health 
care program. In its initial years, while funding was scarce, it is in high demand. By 2007 
the government was investing up to 30 yuan per capita into the program. 
 
Farm Subsidies and Taxes 
The government launched a massive program of direct subsidies in 2004 and this 
program is projected to expand further in the coming years. Designed in part to boost 
production of grain (for national food self-sufficiency) and in part as a rural income 
transfer, the national Grain Subsidy and the national new technology program have in a 
very short time become fixtures in the rural economy. Nearly 80 percent of farm 
households receive subsidies. Participation in the program is as high in poor areas as is it 
is in higher-income areas (Tan et al., 2006). Although they were relatively small in the 
first year of the program, by the second year, between the two programs, many farmers 
were receiving about 10 to 15 yuan per mu, which is more than 70 yuan per acre.  
  While farmers were obviously predisposed to favoring the program (who does not 
like direct subsidies), there are several issues that China must weigh in considering the 
long term benefit and sustainability of the program. First, is whether or not payments 
under the Grain Subsidies should be counted towards the nation’s Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS) at the WTO. In its accession to WTO, China agreed to keep its distorting 
payments in agriculture below 8.5 percent of Agricultural Gross Domestic Product. 
Obviously, if these payments were counted against the AMS, China could rapidly   25
approach its maximum level of payments. But there is a question about whether these 
payments are “distorting or not.” In 2004, a survey by RCRE found that more than 70 
percent of the payments were decoupled, with farmers receiving the payment whether 
they planted grain or any other crop. If this were the case, then such payments arguably 
could be counted as pure, unlinked transfers and not counted.  However, during the 
second year of the program there was more of an effort to target households that 
produced grain. If the payment is linked to the type of crop planted, it is likely to be 
classified as a distorting subsidy with careful accounting needed to ensure it does not 
violate the restriction on distorting subsidies under China’s WTO commitments. 
  In addition to subsidies, the national government has eliminated almost all taxes 
and fees in rural villages. In 2001 and 2002, all fees were converted to a single 
agricultural tax that was not to exceed 8.5 percent of a household’s (village’s) gross value 
of agricultural output. However, no sooner had this been implemented than the tax was 
eliminated altogether. By 2007, surveys showed that farmers were paying almost no 
taxes.  
  When added together, the recent policy innovations in rural infrastructure, free 
rural school tuition, grain and other agricultural subsidies, tax reductions and health 
insurance subsidies are substantial. These government programs have likely injected 
enough funds to contribute importantly to the observed improvements in household 
incomes in rural areas.  
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Improving Mobility of Labor out of Agriculture 
China began the period under study with around half of its workforce in agriculture and 
will reduce this fraction to just a few percent by the time she reaches high income status. 
The rate of migration out of agriculture consistent with China’s growth path is one of the 
most rapid ever observed. In almost all rapidly-growing economies, the resistance to this 
adjustment, particularly due to sector and region-specific investments in human capital, is 
frequently seen as the source of a “farm problem” in which farm incomes fall below 
incomes in the rest of the economy. 
The usual resistances to labor out-migration are compounded by a number of 
China-specific factors. One is the hukou residence permit system, which has restricted 
mobility of labor into urban areas (see Sicular and Zhao 2004). Another is the land tenure 
system, where households leaving the agricultural sector completely must relinquish their 
land without compensation (Zhao 1999). Other China-specific resistances have come 
from factors such as the low quality of educational opportunities in rural areas discussed 
above. Unless these structural rigidities to mobility of labor out of agriculture are 
reduced, the effectiveness of other reforms, such as tax cuts or price supports, is likely to 
be diminished greatly, as excess labor remains bottled up in agriculture, earning low 
returns. Where out-migration is feasible, de Brauw and Giles (2008) show that it 
increases the living standards of the family members remaining, and tends to increase 
their land holdings, although not necessarily their investment in other assets.  
During the period we consider, the hukou system has been relaxed considerably, 
to the point where it is regarded by some, but not all, labor economists as a relatively 
minor source of resistance to overall labor mobility out of agriculture. Relatively little   27
appears, so far, to have been done to change the land tenure system to reduce this barrier 
to mobility. The improvements in rural education discussed above seem likely to play a 
key role in enhancing mobility, both by increasing returns from work outside agriculture, 
and by lowering the costs of adjusting (Fan and Hertel 2004). 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
The main finding of this paper is that the nature of policy intervention in China’s 
agriculture has changed dramatically over the past 25 years, transforming the agricultural 
sector from one characterized by high and variable distortions to one that is relatively 
liberal. In the 1980s and early 1990s (or the early reform period) there were distortions in 
both external and domestic policies that isolated domestic producers and consumers from 
international markets.  
During the early reform period domestic marketing and pricing policies actually 
served to make the prices that domestic producers and consumers faced almost 
independent from the effects of trade policy. In the case of rice and other exportable 
commodities, heavy border distortions that reduced domestic prices were compounded by 
a domestic procurement system that depressed farm prices and the prices paid by urban 
consumers.. Similar dynamics characterized importable commodities such as wheat and 
soybeans where, despite fairly high rates of protection from trade policies, producer 
prices were relatively low. 
In contrast, since the late 1980s and early 1990s (the late reform period), the 
liberalization of domestic markets has reduced the distortions from domestic policies (as 
the market gradually has replaced the state as the primary mechanism for allocating   28
resources and has became the basis for farmers’ production and marketing decisions). At 
the same time, especially in the case of importable commodities, trade policy has been 
liberalized, with distortions from border measures falling substantially. As a result, we 
find that in recent years (that is, by the end of the late reform period), China’s agriculture 
is much less distorted in two ways. First, the differences between international and 
domestic market prices have narrowed considerably for many commodities due to trade 
policy liberalization. Second, the elimination of domestic policy distortions increased 
farm prices for many commodities. Reductions in protection to non-agricultural 
tradables—a major element of the WTO accession negotiations—also appear to have 
reduced the costs imposed on the agricultural sector. 
The main question, once the trade liberalization is established, then, shifts gear 
and the focus of our analysis begins to try to understand how it could be—when there are 
many places in China that have experienced large falls in protection to the agricultural 
tariffs that they produce—that rural incomes still rose almost nationwide. In trying to 
explain this puzzle, we examine three sources of income increases that might help offset 
the fall in income brought on by trade liberalization. We explored the role of agricultural 
technology, the rise of markets and the emergence of new subsidy and support policies.  
In our analysis we find that at the same time that trade liberalization policy was 
reducing returns to some products that had been receiving positive protection, a number 
of other elements were working to offset these effects. One was the reductions in taxation 
of other important commodities, such as rice. At the same time, investments in R&D, the 
fostering of markets and the new investment and subsidy programs appear to have 
generated wide-ranging, positive income effects in rural China.    29
The implications of these findings are that, although trade policies may have had 
negative effects on incomes in certain parts of the agricultural community, the magnitude 
of these adverse impacts appears to have been widely overstated. This is partly because 
the usual way of assessing the impact of WTO commitments—comparisons of bound 
tariffs with prior applied tariffs—widely overstates the extent of liberalization required in 
China. Another reason that these adverse impacts have frequently been overstated is that 
the agricultural sector as a whole was negatively protected at the beginning of the period, 
and most of this taxation has been eliminated. Another important source of gains was the 
reduction in protection to some less-efficient import-competing sectors, which allowed 
farmers to increase the value of their output. There were also important dynamic benefits 
as new export activities emerged, and the cost to burden on agriculture of protection to 
nonagricultural sectors was reduced.  
The reforms undertaken in China have included both trade policy reforms and 
complementary domestic reforms that have helped to create greater opportunities for 
rural people—a combination of policies widely seen as necessary if the greatest benefits 
are to be achieved. China’s experience over the past quarter century appears to provide 
some important lessons both for the future, and for policy makers grappling with similar 
challenges in other countries.   30
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Table 1: Real Per Capita Net Income of Rural Households by Province in 
China, 2000-2005 (in Real 2005 Yuan).  
Province 2000  2005 
Growth (%) 





Beijing  4790   7346   53.36   8.93 
Tianjin  3830   5580   45.68   7.82 
Hebei  2711   3482   28.41   5.13 
Shanxi  2127   2891   35.90   6.33 
Inner Mongolia  2318   2989   28.97   5.22 
Liaoning  2671   3690   38.18   6.68 
Jilin  2215   3264   47.37   8.06 
Heilongjiang  2339   3221   37.75   6.61 
Shanghai  5809   8248   41.97   7.26 
Jiangsu  3960   5276   33.25   5.91 
Zhejiang  4603   6660   44.70   7.67 
Anhui  2095   2641   26.08   4.74 
Fujian  3467   4450   28.36   5.12 
Jiangxi  2255   3129   38.77   6.77 
Shangdong  2960   3931   32.80   5.84 
Henan  2195   2871   30.80   5.52 
Hubei  2526   3099   22.68   4.17 
Hunan  2452   3118   27.17   4.92 
Guangdong  3838   4690   22.22   4.10 
Guangxi  1991   2495   25.32   4.62 
Hainan  2346   3004   28.06   5.07 
Chongqing  2015   2809   39.39   6.87 
Sichuan  2109   2803   32.90   5.85 
Guizhou  1513   1877   24.02   4.40 
Yunnan  1615   2042   26.40   4.80 
Tibet  1414   2078   46.99   8.01 
Shanxi  1620   2053   26.68   4.84 
Gansu  1656   1980   19.53   3.63 
Qinghai  1729   2151   24.40   4.46 
Ningxia  1891   2509   32.64   5.81 
Xinjiang  1796   2482   38.24   6.69 
National Average  2462   3255   32.21   5.74 
Note: values are in real 2005 Yuan using rural consumer price index by 
province. 
Data source: NBSC, Statistical Yearbook of China, 2001-2006. 










Table 2.  Annual growth rate (%) of yield and total cost of main grain crop in China, 1985 to 2004. 
 1985-1994  1995-2004  Crop 

















































Table 3. Annual Growth Rate (%) of Main Grain Crops’s Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Decomposition into Technical Efficiency (TE) and 
Technical Change (TC) in China, 1985 to 2004. 
 
  1985-1994   1995-2004 
  TFP  TE TC    TFP  TE TC 
Early Indica  1.84 -0.03 1.88    2.82 0  2.82 
 
Late Indica  1.85 0.26 1.59    2.92  0.21 2.71 
 
Japonica  -0.12 -0.37 0.26    2.52  0.15  2.37 
 
Wheat  0.25 1.08 -0.83    2.16  1.06 1.10 
 

















Data source: Jin et al., 2007. 
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Table 4. Actual protection, applied tariffs and out-of-quota tariff bindings. 
 
 Actual  Protection 
1995 
Applied tariff  Out-of-quota tariff 
bindings 
  % % % 
Rice  –5 114 65 
Wheat  25 114 65 
Corn  20 114 65 
Soybean 30  22  3 
Sugar  44 114 50 
Cotton  20 30 40 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 1. Rural Retail Price (free market price), Urban Retail Price and Farm-gate Sales 
Price in China, 1980 to 2005 (Real 2005 Yuan). 
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Data Source: China Price Yearbook, 2005   40
 
Figure 2: Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) and Nominal Rates of Assistance for 
Farmers (NRAfs) for rice and wheat in China, 1981-2005 
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Figure 3. Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) and Nominal Rates of Assistance for 
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Figure 4. Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) and Nominal Rates of Assistance for 
Farmers (NRAfs) for industrial processed goods (milk and sugar production)  in China, 
1981-2005 
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Figure 5. Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) and Nominal Rates of Assistance for 






















Note: These measures are calculated in the same way as NRAs and NRAfs reported for 
other commodities. However, the true NRAs for these commodities become zero after 








Figure 6. Rates of Assistance (including subsidy/taxes on inputs) for farmers that Produce 
Importable Commodities, Exportable Commodities and for All of Agriculture (11 
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1 While NRAs only measure differences in output prices, there may also be distortions on 
the input side, our NRAf measures include a number of budget support and tax measures.. 
The assumption and methods that were used to generate our exchange rate series are in 
Martin et al. (2006).  
 